Self-Help Groups (SHGs) are the most common form of microfinance in India. We provide evidence that these groups, composed of women only, undertake collective actions for the provision of public goods. We study how this impacts the variety of public goods the elected local authorities deal with. A simple model suggests predictions that we test and confirm using first hand data. We show that local authorities provide a larger variety of public goods when SHGs undertake collective actions. Moreover, the increase is in the public goods preferred by SHGs. These include goods that exert a negative externality on other villagers or whose importance the authorities were not aware of. We provide evidence of an important non-financial benefit of microfinance: it provides a platform that allows socially disadvantaged women to meet regularly and discuss problems. When they undertake collective actions to solve those problems, these are recognized by the local authorities. Problems that are closer to the needs of women seem to find their way into the political agenda.
Introduction
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) are the most common form of microfinance in India. Their primary aim is to help the poor to save and borrow: members pool their savings to create a common fund and give out small loans to one another. At a later stage, SHGs can open savings accounts with commercial banks and apply for loans. In several regions of rural India, women are relatively disadvantaged. They are restricted in their physical mobility, their public role is minimal and their access to information is limited. In such a context, SHGs also provide a platform that allows women to meet regularly and to interact with each other.
Economic theory suggests that repeated interaction between individuals can help building social capital. Feigenberg et al. (2011) provide some experimental evidence of this. They show that microfinance clients are more likely to develop friendships and social ties if they meet more frequently. However, they suggest that, since the scope of the meetings is financial intermediation, microfinance mainly affects economic cooperation. We provide evidence that cooperation can go beyond economic motives. We describe how SHG members undertake collective actions aiming to solve problems affecting their villages. Our aim is to evaluate the impact of this behavior on the local communities.
A number of studies provide evidence that men and women have diverging preferences for some public policies (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002) . Still, in many countries, women's preferences hardly find their way into the political agenda. Some governments have imposed political reservations in an attempt to bias policy choices in favor of women. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show this had a significant impact in India. In our paper, we explore an alternative channel through which the preferences of women can sway political decisions. We document how the collective actions undertaken by SHGs influence the variety of public goods the local authorities deal with.
To perform our analysis, we focus on the lowest official authority in rural India, namely the Gram Panchayat. It is divided in several wards. 1 A representative, known as ward member is elected in each of those wards. He is the official spokesperson of the villagers: his main responsibility is communicating the ward's problems and needs to the officers in charge, who have the power and the financial means to solve the issues. The ward member is the only official body appointed for these duties. But we found evidence that other unofficial bodies visit functionaries on their own initiative to lobby for particular interventions. We distinguish three different types of such bodies: SHGs, single individuals, and some other groups of villagers that meet regularly for non-financial reasons. We label this residual category as Other Groups.
The main focus of the paper is on the influence of the collective actions undertaken by SHGs. The SHGs we analyze were all created by the same NGO, called PRADAN, without interventions of the local governments. Their programme aims at providing financial intermediation and does not have an explicit socio-political agenda. 2 In these respects, SHGs are different than Other Groups. In our sample, 24.5% of Other Groups are created thanks to direct interventions of the local government.
In September 2010, we conducted a survey to ask SHG members what kind of problems they had faced in their ward and what they had done to solve them. Some groups merely discussed problems during their meetings, but others undertook collective actions to tackle them. These actions consisted of manual interventions, campaigns in the village, or visits to an officer to ask for a solution. When these costly activities are instrumental to the solution of a problem that concerns the whole ward, they can be considered as public goods. This is the approach that we take in the rest of the paper: we consider as a public good any costly action undertaken by WMs, SHGs, Individuals and Other Groups aiming explicitly at the solution of a ward problem.
Our data show that SHGs mainly focus on issues related to excessive alcohol consumption, schooling and forest exploitation. Excessive alcohol consumption is mainly a men problem in India (see Neufeld et al., 2005) , and households recognize its negative impact in terms of budget (see Mishra, 1999 and Duflo, 2007) . There is also strong evidence that alcoholism triggers domestic violence (Rao, 1997 , Panda and Agarwal, 2005 , Babu and Kar, 2010 . School problems are mainly related to the provision of free midday meals, sanitation and teacher quality. The interest in these issues confirms the common finding that women generally spend more time and resources for children's welfare (see Anderson and Baland, 2002 and Duflo, 2011) . The interest in forest is due to their importance for the households' livelihood.
We also interviewed the ward members elected in the past 20 years (1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007) . Their main focus is on the major responsibilities of the Gram Panchayat: village infrastructure and welfare schemes. But we provide evidence that the range of village problems ward members take care of is also influenced by the activities of SHGs: when SHGs undertake collective actions, ward members are more likely to deal with problems that are closer to the preferences of women.
We propose a simple theoretical explanation for this observation. In a political economy framework, we model the interaction between the ward member and the SHG. The ward member maximizes a possibly biased measure of total welfare in his ward. But he faces a heterogeneous population, with possible conflicting preferences over the types of public goods that should be provided. The SHGs, after observing the behavior of the ward member, decide whether or not to complement the ward member's effort by undertaking collective actions. The model suggests two predictions that we test using first hand data.
The first prediction is that collective actions by SHGs lead ward member to the provision of a larger variety of public goods. The second prediction states that ward members begin or increase the provision of public goods that SHGs prefer. These include goods that exert a negative externality on other villagers or goods whose importance the ward member was not aware of. Both predictions are confirmed by our empirical results. We find that ward members deal with on average one extra type of good after SHGs start undertaking actions. In particular, they are on average 28% more likely to deal with alcohol issues, 25% more with forest issues and 23% more with school problems. These are all issues SHGs are particularly interested in.
Some of the extra problems the ward members deal with are related to public goods that can exert a negative externality on subgroups of villagers. The best example is alcohol production and consumption. As most ward members are men, it is not surprising that they are less likely to deal with it before SHGs start undertaking collective actions. They might also be reluctant to act against their neighbors or friends, since they are an important part of their electorate.
Our work contributes to the literature on the impact of microfinance. Evaluating the impact of these programmes is difficult because of self-selection into groups. To identify the causal effect, Banerjee et al. (2010) randomly selected slums for opening an MFI branch. Karlan and Zinman (2010) randomly approved loans within a pool of "marginal" applicants. Both papers also investigate whether microfinance has non-financial effects. The former examined education, health and women's empowerment while the latter considered a measure of well-being. Both studies do not find any significant impact, but their setup allows measuring the impact in the short-term only (i.e. within 20 months after providing access to microfinance). We suggest that a longer time span can be necessary to assess potential non-financial benefits: in our sample SHGs undertake the first collective action after on average 3 years of weekly meetings only. The added value of our data set is that it allows us to measure the influence of SHGs up to 13 years after their creation.
Our work is also related to other strands of the literature. Chowdhury et al. (2004) discuss why, in evaluating the impact of microfinance programs, non-client beneficiaries ought to be considered. We follow a very similar approach in describing how the behavior of SHGs can influence the governance of rural Indian communities.
Several authors study the incentives for private provision of public goods and propose various explanations for the empirical finding that people provide more than what theory predicts. Polborn (2008) emphasizes the role of reputation, whereas Andreoni (1989) proposes impure altruism (warm glow). These different views have been recently reconciled in a comprehensive model by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) . We do not model explicitly the motives behind SHGs' actions, and we rather draw on the findings of Feigenberg et al. (2011) who provide evidence that the frequency of meetings is a determinant of long-run increases in social interaction.
Our theoretical model is based on the framework proposed in Besley and Coate (2003) and Besley and Coate (1998) , that has also been applied by Besley et al. (2004) to Indian local governments. In its original formulation, the model studies the trade-off between centralization and decentralization of public good provision. We modify this set-up by introducing private provision by microfinance groups: SHGs and the local government interact strategically to determine the type and the quantity of public goods to provide.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data set, the village organization and the collective actions undertaken. In Section 3, we propose a simple model suggesting the predictions that we test in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the effectiveness of actions undertaken by SHGs and in Section 6 we conclude.
Background information 2.1 Data set
Data collection was assisted by our partner NGO, named PRADAN (Professional Assistance for Development Action). It is specialized in the creation of SHGs, consisting of women only, that it considers as an effective tool to strengthen the livelihood of socio-economically disadvantaged people (PRADAN, 2005) .
In 2006, Baland, Somanathan and Vandewalle surveyed all PRADAN SHGs created in the Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar districts of Odisha (independent of whether the groups were still actively meeting or not). They collected information on 532 SHGs and 8,589 women who, at some point, belonged to these groups (Baland et al., 2008) . In the autumn of 2010, we complemented this data set in two ways. First, we revisited those SHGs to gather information on the collective actions they undertook. Second, we did an elaborate village survey to collect data on the activities of ward members. As PRADAN started working in Odisha in 1998 and as we need information dating back to the period before the creation of the first SHG, we interviewed the ward members elected in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. 3 We also recorded the activities of Other Groups and Individuals.
In total, we gathered information on 425 SHGs, 462 ward members, 94 Other Groups, 132 Individuals who visited officers and 844 Individuals who never visited one, covering 112 villages and 147 wards. 4
Village structure
In rural India, the lowest official authority is the Gram Panchayat. It is composed of 5 to 15 contiguous villages. The 73rd Amendment Act 1992 of the Constitution of India empowers the State Legislature "to endow the Panchayats with the power and authority necessary to prepare the plans and implement the schemes for economic development and social justice". The main responsibilities passed onto the Gram Panchayat are managing local infrastructure and identifying villagers who are entitled to welfare schemes (Xaxa, 2010) .
Each Gram Panchayat is divided into wards and is governed by one Sarpanch, a Naib-Sarpanch and several ward members. One ward member (henceforth WM) is elected in each ward. WMs have the right to access the records of the Gram Panchayat, to question any officer about the administration and to inspect the actions undertaken by the Gram Panchayat. They inform government officers in charge, who have financial means and power, about the ward's problems and needs. Apart from the Sarpanch, higher authorities at the block or district level can be approached. As the Gram Panchayat is mainly responsible for managing village infrastructure and welfare schemes, these public goods are the main responsibility of the WMs too (Xaxa, 2010) .
As described in the introduction, though SHGs are created for financial intermediation, we find evidence that members participate in collective actions aiming to solve problems concerning their ward. They undertake these actions as a group: at the moment of the first action, out of the on average 15 members, 11 are actively involved. WMs are usually aware of these actions. 63.1% of the groups informed the WM before they visited an officer for the first time. 5 Other Groups consist of villagers who meet on average once a month, for a specific, non-financial reason. They are mainly forest committees (69.2%), i.e. groups of people dedicating time and resources to avoid forest exploitation. Some of these committees are created by officers of the forest department (35.4%). 6 Others formed for village help (26.6%), cultural activities (3.2%) and farming issues (1.0%). If we exclude forest committee, 90% of the remaining groups are created by people living in the same neighborhood. The remaining 10% were founded by NGOs. 55.8% of the wards have at least one group classified as Other Group.
We label as Individuals the villagers who visited an officer on their own personal initiative. They did not join any group, but dealt themselves with the issues they were interested in. Although we might not have been able to identify all Individuals, we believe we interviewed an important subset of them. Our main motivation to survey Individuals is being able to tell them apart from villagers who joined either an SHG or an Other Group. Table 1 shows the characteristics of WMs, members of SHGs, members of Other Groups and Individuals who dealt with ward problems at least once (columns (1) to (5)). The members of Other Groups differ from SHG members in several respects: they are mainly men, are more educated and own about 1 acre more of land. SHG members differ also from WMs and Individuals: the latter are better educated and own more land. 31% of the WMs are women. This is close to what we expect based on the reservation of seats imposed by the Indian Law. 7 Remarkably, women rarely visit officers alone (2.3%).
The columns (6) to (9) show the characteristics of bodies who never dealt with ward problems. Compared to the correspondent bodies who did, we find that SHG members are slightly less educated, while the profile of Other Group members is not much different. To gather information on Individuals, we interviewed in each village a random selection of people, who belong neither to an SHG nor to an Other Group and who did not deal with ward problems individually. Female Individuals are slightly more educated and own more land than SHG members. We find the opposite for male Individuals: they are less educated and 5 The first action mostly concerns village infrastructure (33.6%), forest issues (26.1%) and alcohol problems (21.9%). See Appendix A for a description of the problems.
6 As most villages are located close to the forest, households depend on it for cooking and as a source of income (for example, an important source of income is making leaf plates). The increasing population rose the pressure on the forest. To prevent excessive deforestation, villagers formed voluntary forest committees. Later, the forest department started supporting existing committees and created new ones. They provide training, supplies and introduce new ways of sustainable exploitation of the forest. 7 One-third of the seats must be reserved for women. The reservation of seats is allotted by rotation of the different wards (Xaxa, 2010) . 
Collective actions
We asked WMs, SHGs and Other Groups, which kind of problems their wards faced. We also asked whether they discussed those problems within groups and whether they visited an officer (to ask for a solution) or intervened directly. Direct interventions can consist of attempts to solve the problem (for instance, repairing a tube well) or organizing sensitization campaigns in the village (for example, against alcohol production). A brief explanation of the different problems is given in Appendix A. Columns (1), (3) and (5) in Table 2 show, for each issue, the percentage of WMs, SHGs and Other Groups that visited an officer at least once to ask for a solution. Similarly, columns (2), (4) and (6) report the percentage of WMs, SHGs and Other Groups that tried to solve a problem by either visiting an officer or by intervening directly. The data show that WMs and, except for forest issues, Other Groups are unlikely to intervene directly in the village. If they deal with a particular problem, they mostly do it by visiting the officer in charge. SHGs instead, intervene directly for several issues. The most important ones are alcohol and forest problems.
As expected, WMs are the most important actors to deal with village infrastructure and welfare schemes, i.e. the main responsibilities of the Gram Panchayat. Other Groups are mainly interested in forest related issues. They typically have a very specific focus: the average Other Group deals with slightly more than one public good only. The majority of SHGs also deal with problems related to village infrastructure and forest, and a remarkable share of them spends time on welfare schemes. But they are less likely to deal with those issues than WMs and Other Groups. SHGs are the most important actor for alcohol and school problems. The focus on alcohol issues is in line with the findings of a wide literature on the topic. 8 Some SHGs visited officers to request the suspension of alcohol licenses. Others intervened directly by organizing anti-alcohol campaigns or trying to dissuade households from producing alcohol. This is quite interesting since anecdotal evidence suggests that women consider alcohol consumption as a prerogative of men. Therefore, they rarely undertake legal actions, even in case of domestic violence or abuse. Indeed, we could not find any woman undertaking an action alone. The interest in school problems is also in line with the common finding that women generally spend more time and resources on family welfare than men. Furthermore, in our survey, SHGs are responsible for providing midday meals at schools in 22.3% of the villages. 8 The literature shows three main facts. First, households realize that alcohol consumption reduces the budget available for primary expenses (Mishra, 1999) . According to Banerjee and Duflo (2007) alcohol ranks among the first goods that poor families would like to eliminate from their consumption bundle if they had more self-control. Secondly, in India, men are 9.7 times more likely than women to regularly consume alcohol (Neufeld et al., 2005) . Finally, there is strong evidence that alcoholism triggers violence against women. Rao (1997) and Panda and Agarwal (2005) show that the risk of wife abuse increases significantly with alcohol consumption. Babu and Kar (2010) find that domestic violence is pervasive in Eastern India, which includes Odisha. They show that alcohol consumption is an important risk factor for physical, psychological and sexual violence against women.
SHGs are less likely to deal with forest issues than Other Groups. Yet, their focus on these type of problems is not surprising, as the livelihood of many households depends on forest. Moreover, 29.7% of the SHGs received training from PRADAN to improve their forest-based sources of income. Finally, few SHGs take care of problems related to dowry and child marriage. 9 As mentioned in the introduction, the main focus of the paper is on SHGs. The groups we analyze were all created by the NGO PRADAN. To start the SHG programme, PRADAN selected administrative blocks with high levels of rural poverty. In Odisha, where we conducted our study, there was no involvement of the government in this decision; there is also no evidence that the government has ever opposed the creation of SHGs. Furthermore, PRADAN's SHG programme has no explicit socio-political agenda. Therefore, we believe it is reasonable to assume that the creation of SHGs is not influenced by the elected WMs. This is not necessarily the case for Other Groups, as an important subset of them is created thanks to government interventions and for socio-political reasons. For completeness, we check whether the inclusion of Other Groups in the empirical analysis changes the results (see Section 4.4).
We study whether collective actions of SHGs influence the activities of the WMs. Unfortunately, we cannot measure changes in the productivity of WMs: we do not know precisely how often each problem appeared, how often the WM tried to solve it and how successful he was. But we do know the issues he tackles and this is what we exploit in what follows. Table 3 shows the percentage of WMs who dealt with each of the problems. What matters for our analysis is the timing of the WM's mandate as compared to the creation and evolution of SHGs. Thus, we first classify WMs depending on whether their mandate finished before the first SHG was created in the ward (column (1)) or after (column (2)). These simple descriptive statistics document a sharp increase for almost all problems.
This preliminary analysis can be slightly refined by taking into account that SHGs do not undertake collective actions from the very start of their existence. SHGs are created for financial intermediation, and not for public good provision. On average, they undertake the first collective action after about three years of weekly meetings only. 10 Thus, if the 9 Dowry problems and child marriage are not common among scheduled tribes and scheduled castes (the main caste categories in the area where we conducted our survey). Therefore, the number of SHGs that focus on these type of issues is limited. For this reason we do not consider these problems in the remainder of the paper. 10 Mishra (1999) describes the process leading SHGs to different forms of cooperation as a three-stage evolution over time. In the first stage, group members have a minimum level of awareness and need to shed their prejudices. In the next stage, groups experience pressure from both outside and inside that helps the Significance of the difference relative to column (1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 activities of the WMs are influenced by the collective actions of SHGs, we might observe a change only when SHGs start showing interest. In other words, the mere creation of an SHG might not matter. For this reason, we split the time frame after the creation of SHGs. We report the percentage of WMs who dealt with a problem depending on whether his mandate finished after the creation of the first SHG but before an SHG undertook collective actions in his ward (column (3)) or after the first SHG did so (column (4)). For most issues, we observe an increase after the creation of the first SHG in the ward, but a significant increase occurs after the first SHG undertook action only.
Notice that the activity of the WMs, before SHGs were created, is very different across issues. While about 72% of them took care of village infrastructure, only 2.3% got involved in alcohol issues, and 5.3% in school problems. This is interesting since SHG members reported that these issues were relevant in almost all the wards (see Table 10 in Section 5 for the exact figures). This means that, in a number of cases, despite the existence of a problem, the WM did not intervene to provide a solution. There are two possible explanations for this. First, the WMs might not have been aware of the problem, or of the importance emergence of a group leader and shapes internal norms. Groups reach the third stage when they agree on their objective. They start functioning as a team, recognize common problems (both economic and social) and undertake collective actions. Following this reasoning, we believe that groups deal with elaborated non-financial issues only when they reached a minimum level of financial stability. thereof for some of the villagers. Second, the WMs, despite being aware of the issue, might have deliberately decided not to solve it. The latter explanation is relevant when wards are composed of heterogeneous agents, differently affected by a particular issue. In this case, there can be disagreement between villagers about the importance, or even existence of a problem. More importantly, the solution of a problem can create negative externalities on a part of the population. When this happens, the WMs, trading off costs and benefits for its voters, can decide deliberately not to take care of an issue.
Given the context we are analyzing, we believe both explanations are reasonable. In particular, the fact that the activities of SHGs seem to be related to the increase in the provision of neglected public goods suggests that differences in preferences between women and men might be playing a central role. Moreover, women, in Odisha, have a limited participation in political life. Female WMs are elected almost exclusively thanks to reservations and their profile is different from the average SHG member: they are better educated and own more land (see Table 1 ). Hence, some of the problems SHG members are interested in might be omitted from the political agenda.
Besides that, PRADAN provides training to improve the forest-based sources of income of households. This process of sensitization creates new interests for women. Through their collective actions, SHGs might be disseminating the messages learned to the community they belong to.
In Section 3, we provide a simple theoretical model that formalizes both the situations described above. We use it to give an intuitive explanation of why WMs might be enlarging the set of issues under their responsibility. We believe it to be a strategic response to the collective actions of SHGs. Our model suggests two predictions that we test in Section 4.
The model
We want to understand why and if WMs have incentives to deal with a different set of public goods as a response to the collective actions of SHGs. The model we propose is close to the ones of Besley and Coate (2003) and Besley et al. (2004) .
Several factors play a role in public good provision. To provide the financial means or to undertake the administrative steps needed to solve a problem, government officers need to know about the existence of the problem and be convinced about the necessity of a solution. Villagers judge the WMs' work based on the final provision, which is the result of several activities, ranging over the dialogue with citizens, lobbying at higher levels of the public administration and some direct interventions. As any of these activities is instrumental to the provision of public goods, it is a public good per se. In what follows, for the sake of simplicity, we adopt this broader definition of public good provision, that includes any costly activity undertaken by the WM and the SHGs aiming at the solution of a problem of collective interest. The cost of provision takes into account the time spent, the transportation costs, but also the potential social burden for taking unpopular or conflicting positions.
Suppose there are two different types of villagers (1 and 2) and that the public goods can be classified in two different categories, also labeled with 1 and 2. Let g 1 and g 2 be the number of public goods of type 1 and 2 respectively. A villager of type i has a (weak) preference for goods of type i, with i ∈ {1, 2}, but also benefits/suffers an externality induced by goods of type −i. This is described by the following utility function:
where λ i ∈ [−1, 1] denotes the level of externality that good −i generates for type i. When λ i > 0 the externality is positive, whereas it is negative when λ i < 0. Without loss of generality, we can think of villagers of type 1 as being men and public goods 1 as being goods men are particularly interested in. Hence, villagers of type 2 are women.
We solve two different specifications of the model. In the basic set-up, the WM is the only public good provider. 11 Next, we enrich the model with an SHG that can undertake collective actions to complement the provision of the WM. Since SHGs consist of women, we assume that only type 2 villagers can form a group. 12 We consider the decision to form an SHG as exogenous and for simplicity we assume that all women belong to it. We model the competitive interaction between the SHG and the WM in a sequential way. We assume that the WM can provide a total number of goods T ∈ [0, T max ] by incurring a total linear cost kT , with k ∈ [0, 1]. The SHG incurs a cost c per unit provided, with c ∈ [0, 1]. 13
Basic set-up
We start by modeling a situation in which the WM is the only public good provider. The WM chooses the total number of public goods T to provide and how to allocate it between g 1 and g 2 . Let g = (g 1 , g 2 ) and λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ). Suppose that the WM is fully aware of the 11 For simplicity and without loss of generality we do not consider public good provision by single villagers. 12 This asymmetry is motivated by the fact that the WMs are mainly man, so we can expect them to be taking good care of the group they belong to. Since we are interested in analyzing changes in the variety of public goods provided, and not in the intensity of the provision, this restriction does not bias our results. 13 The assumption that WMs and SHGs incur linear costs are taken for the ease of exposition. Assuming convex costs would not change our results. We normalize the parameter range (k and c ∈ [0, 1]) to avoid the utility function taking negative values.
heterogeneity of the population in his ward. In other words, he knows that men and women have different preferences and which public goods each type prefers. In this case, the WM maximizes, in two steps, the following function:
The WM maximizes the weighted sum of the utilities of both types of users, subject to its budget constraint and a non-negativity constraint for g i . We consider the weight µ as an exogenous variable that can be interpreted in different ways: we set µ > 1/2 to describe a WM biased towards type 1 villagers, for example because he is a type 1 himself; µ can also represent the proportion of type 1 villagers, or can be the result of a decision process maximizing the probability of the WM being reelected. Thus, the model also applies to situations in which the WM is not fully benevolent. 14 We first determine the optimal allocation g 1 and g 2 for any given T , and then we determine the optimal T . The results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. When the WM is the only public good provider, he setsĝ 1 ,ĝ 2 ,T such that:
To avoid corner solutions, we have taken the simplifying assumption thatT ≤ T max , i.e. that the WM has some unused resources. Note thatĝ 2 is decreasing in µ, whereasĝ 1 is increasing. This is intuitive: when type 2 villagers have less importance for the WM, a smaller amount of resources is devoted to the provision of their favorite goods. Moreover, when λ 1 < λ 2 ,T is decreasing in µ. If type 2 goods generate a smaller spillover on type 1 villagers, the WM provides a smaller number of public goods as µ increases. The decrease ofĝ 2 is larger than the increase ofĝ 1 , so thatT decreases.
The solution shows that, as negative externalities between the two types of public goods are possible, there are situations in which the WM decides not to provide one type of goods.
To see that, consider g 2 and note thatĝ 2 = 0 if λ 1 ≤ µ−1 µ . Since µ ∈ [ 1 2 , 1], this condition implies that goods g 2 will not be provided if λ 1 is negative and sufficiently small. A similar condition applies forĝ 1 . In case of negative externalities, the WM trades off the benefit a public good produces on one type of villagers with the disutility it creates for the other type. When the disutility outweighs the benefit, the WM prefers not to provide it at all.
Another interesting case is the one in which the WM is aware of the differences in men and women preferences (i.e. he knows the value of λ 2 ), but not of the existence of type 2 goods. In other words, he does not know that there exist some interventions that women would particularly appreciate. The solution of this case is trivial: the WM setsĝ 1 = T max andĝ 2 = 0. 15
If goods of type 2 are not provided, the SHG (i.e. type 2 villagers) can have incentives to take care of their provision. This is what we model in the next subsection.
Private and public provision
Suppose that an SHG has been formed. It provides g 2c goods of type 2 to complement the WM's provision. Actions are taken sequentially with the following timing:
• t = 1: The SHG decides whether to be active. If yes, it communicates it to the WM.
• t = 2: The WM chooses the optimal T and how to allocate it between g 1 and g 2 .
• t = 3: The SHG observes g 1 and g 2 and provides g 2c .
Our choice of the timing stems from the observation of the relationship between WMs and SHGs. First, note that WMs provided public goods well before the start of the SHG programme. More importantly, as described in Section 2.2, 63% of the groups contacted the WM before visiting an officer. Thus, the WM is aware of the fact that SHGs are active and, as a first mover, can modify his behavior to take into account the reaction of SHGs. 16 The 15 It might also be the case that the WM is not aware of the different preferences that men and women have. This can be modeled by setting µ = 1. We then find thatĝ 1 = 1 k ,ĝ 2 = λ1 k and T = 1+λ1 k . We do not further emphasize this case, as we believe it is not realistic in our setting. 16 In this type of sequential model, the first mover strategy has the value of a strong commitment. The type of actions we consider cannot be undone since, to be consistent with our empirical analysis, the relevant time spam of our game should coincide with the mandate of the WM. In any case, we believe it is more natural to expect such a commitment from the WMs, since they are elected and are institutionally assigned the task to take care of ward problems. The interest in a particular type of ward problem can, for instance, be declared in the local electoral campaign. The SHGs are created for a different reason, so that it is more realistic to think their provision as a reaction to the observation of the WM's strategy. same argument implies that, when SHGs are active, the WM must be aware of both the relevance of type 2 goods and the different preferences of women.
Our data show that some of the public goods were not provided by most WMs before SHGs became active. As discussed above, this implies that either the WM was not aware of their importance or that there were negative externalities. Hereafter, we focus on the latter explanation and assume that λ 1 ≤ 0 and λ 2 ≥ 0, i.e. that the goods women are interested in (and that the SHG can provide) generate a negative externality on men. The results in case the WM is not aware of the interest in some goods follow trivially.
We calculate the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium by backward induction. Hence, we first analyze the maximization problem of the active SHG. When the SHG is not active, the findings of the previous section apply. The SHG solves the following problem:
where g 1 and g 2 are the WM's provisions, considered as constants at this stage. The bestresponse function is:
Since the best-response function depends on g 2 only, we denote it with the shorter notation g 2c (g 2 ). The WM's maximization problem is similar to the one explained in the previous subsection. But now the WM takes into account the reaction of the SHG. Let g = (g 1 , g 2 , g 2c (g 2 )) and λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ). The WM maximizes the following function:
This formulation leads to a particularly simple solution. By replacing g 2c (g 2 ) and the budget constraint into the objective function we get:
The WM first chooses the optimal g 1 and g 2 for any given T . It can be easily calculated that:
that depend only on λ 2 . In fact, λ 1 becomes irrelevant since the action of the SHG no longer allows the WM to control the externality that g 2 exerts on type 1 villagers. Intuitively, if the SHG provides goods of type 2, the externality generated by λ 1 cannot be avoided, no matters what the WM does. We can replace g 2 into g 2c (g 2 ) and calculate the optimal choice of the SHG:
Because of equation (1), it is clear that g 2c = 0 whenever g 2 ≥ 1/c. Noting that the objective function is linear in T , we get the following results:
Lemma 1. Suppose that the SHG is active. If c(1 − µ) ≥ k, then the WM optimally sets g * 1 , g * 2 and T * :
The SHG provides
The condition c(1 − µ) > k implies that the marginal cost of provision borne by SHG members should be bigger than the marginal cost faced by the WM. 18 The condition is required to ensure that the WM's objective function has a positive slope. Since W (T, g * , λ, µ) is linear in T , when c(1 − µ) > k, the WM sets T as high as possible, namely T = T max . This is because he internalizes the cost borne by the SHG and prefers to take care of the provision himself at a lower marginal cost. When instead c(1 − µ) < k, the WM prefers to free ride letting the SHG provide goods of type 2.
Note that g * 1 is increasing in µ, whereas g * 2 is decreasing. Since, by equation (1) the total number of type 2 goods is 1/c, g 2c is increasing in µ: the provisions of the WM and of the SHG are substitutes. This is intuitive: when µ is large, the WM prefers to provide a smaller number of type 2 goods. Therefore, the SHG provides them itself.
We can now compare the provision of type 2 goods. It can easily be verified that g * 2 >ĝ 2 when c takes intermediate values, i.e. the WM's provision of g 2 is larger in the joint provision model.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the SHG is active. Then there exists an interval [c, c] and a k ≥ 0 such that for any c ∈ [c, c] and for any k < k < c(1 − µ), g * 2 >ĝ 2 , i.e. the WM provides a larger number of public goods of type 2 when the SHG is active.
The value of k is defined in Appendix B. Intuitively, if g 2 is low, the SHG has an incentive to provide the good at a cost cg 2c . Since this cost has a negative influence on the welfare function, the WM tries to reduce it by providing part of the good himself. As the marginal cost c increases, the WM provides more and more g 2 , until the point in which g * 2 = 1 c and g * 2c = 0. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . When c is too large, the activities of the SHG can become wasteful, so that the exclusive provision by the WM is more efficient. In those cases, g * 2c = 0. 19 However, when λ 1 ≤ µ−1 µ ,ĝ 2 is equal to zero, so that the continuous horizontal line in Figure 1 corresponds to the horizontal axis. In this case, the upper bound c goes to infinity. The result holds for k large enough (k > k). In fact, if the marginal cost of provision is very low, the WM can always do better than the SHG. Results are similar in the case in which the WM is not aware of the women's problems. Finally, note, if c(1 − µ) > k, the WM sets a (weakly) larger value of T compared to the basic setup: our model predicts that, when the SHG is an active public good provider, the WM takes care of a larger number of ward issues. To understand why, we report the following simple result:
Lemma 3. Suppose that the SHG is active. If c(1 − µ) > k, then: (i) g * 1 <ĝ 1 , i.e. the WM provides a smaller number of public goods of type 1 when the SHG is active; (ii) moreover,
The result shows that there is some substitution between goods of type 1 and 2. When k is very small, the WM can provide a large number of public goods in the basic set up: g 1 andĝ 2 increase as k decreases. Conversely, g * 1 does not depend on k. For this reason, for small values of k, the WM provides a smaller number of type 1 goods when the SHG is active (point (i)).
Point (ii) states that the increase of g * 2 is not completely offset by the decrease of g * 1 . This is possible thanks to the increase of T . In fact, note that |g * 1 −ĝ 1 | is decreasing in k, whereas |g * 2 −ĝ 2 | is increasing. Under the assumptions in point (i) and in Lemma 2, g * 2 >ĝ 2 , so that as k increases,ĝ 2 decreases and the gap widens; the opposite happens for g 1 , as g * 1 <ĝ 1 . So, when k is large enough (as implied by the condition T max >T ), the presence of an SHG has a larger impact on type 2 than on type 1 goods.
As a last step, note that the SHG becomes active if and only if the following condition is fulfilled:
The inequality is satisfied for a wide range of parameters, as summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Characterization). Let c(1 − µ) ≥ k. Then g * 1 , g * 2 , g * 2c and T * are set as described in Lemma 1. Moreover, there exists a δ ∈ (c, c] such that for any c ∈ [c, δ], U c 2 (g * 1 , g * 2 , g * 2c , λ 2 ) = U 2 (ĝ 1 ,ĝ 2 , λ 2 ), i.e. in the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium the SHG is active.
The result is illustrated in Figure 2 . The dashed, discontinuous curve represents the reduced form utility of the SHG when it is active as a function of c. The continuous horizontal line depicts the SHG's utility in the basic setup (i.e. when the SHG stays idle). As we argue in Appendix B, under our assumptions the point c is such that c(1 − µ) = k. In other words, c is the threshold beyond which, in equilibrium, both the WM and the SHGs provide a positive amount of type 2 goods (See Lemma 1). The most interesting results are therefore in the sub-domain [c, 1] . When c ∈ [c,c], both the WM and the SHG provide some type 2 goods. As c increases, there are two effects. On the one hand, the SHG prefers to provide less public goods. At the same time, the WM provides more himself in order to reduce the burden on the SHG. In that region, these effects reinforce each other, so that the reduced utility is increasing in c and always greater than the corresponding basic setup outcome. When c ∈ [c, c], the WM sets g * 2 to its maximum level ( 1 c ), so that the SHG can set g * 2s = 0. In this interval, the SHG still prefers to be active (or to credibly threat to be active) until the point c = δ. In fact, when c is very large, the SHGs would in any case be able to produce very little only. Thus the WM does not need to worry much about the threat of the SHG undertaking collective actions and therefore provides less and less g 2 goods. As stated in Lemma 3, in this interval also g * 1 <ĝ 1 , so that SHG prefers not to be active. For the sake of brevity, in the Appendix we do not analyze in details the case c(1−µ) ≤ k. It is easy to see that in that case U c 2 (g * 1 , g * 2 , g * 2c , λ 2 ) is always decreasing and goes to infinity as c approaches zero. So the SHG always prefers to be active when c is small. Yet, for c close to k 1−µ , the SHG might prefer to stay idle (See region c ∈ [0, c] in Figure 2 ). 
Discussion
The model suggests two simple predictions that we test in Section 4.
-Prediction 1: The active presence of an SHG leads to an increase in the number of issues the WM deals with, as measured by a larger variety of goods.
-Prediction 2: The WM starts dealing with public goods preferred by the SHG (g * 2 >ĝ 2 ). These include public goods that either exert a negative externality on other villagers (λ 1 < 0) or whose importance the WM is not aware of.
The predictions are related to two findings of our model. First, when the SHG is active there is an increase in the total number of public goods provided by the WM. Second, both types of goods are provided in a positive quantity. Exclusive provision by the WM, instead, can lead to no provision of one type of goods, namely goods preferred by women (goods 2 in our model).
Our results depend on the size of the marginal costs. Although it is hard to estimate the marginal cost of undertaking collective actions, we believe our conditions are reasonable given the phenomena we are describing. SHG members face an important psychological cost. As described in the introduction, women are restricted in their physical mobility and public voice in the region where we did our survey. 20 Although visiting an officer or intervening is not necessarily expensive, it can require a substantial amount of time. Moreover, as most of the SHGs take actions as a group, they also exert a significant effort in the organization. For these reasons, we believe that the marginal cost faced by SHGs is substantially larger than the one faced by WMs (c(1 − µ) > k). Still, WMs are not full-time government employees: they have another activity as primary occupation. Thus, also for them, the cost k is not negligible.
Empirical strategy and results
In this section, we test the predictions suggested by our model. Prediction 1 is tested in Section 4.1 and prediction 2 in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we argue that our results are not spurious by showing that WM characteristics do not predict SHGs becoming active. Finally, we provide three robustness checks in Section 4.4.
Prediction 1: Number of issues discussed by the WM
To test the first prediction, we measure the influence of SHGs on the number of different problems the WM deals with. Our survey asked to each WM elected over the past 20 years to recall the type of issues they visited an officer or intervened for. 21 For each ward, we have information about 4 WMs. The survey also records a number of personal characteristics. To know when exactly SHGs started undertaking collective actions, we asked the name of the WM during whose mandate they acted for the first time.
Let T ij be the total number of different issues that WM i in ward j dealt with. It is a count variable which takes values from 0 to 5. The benchmark model for count data is the Poisson model. 22 We assume that the distribution of T ij , conditional on the covariates, is given by:
T ij ! and the mean parameter µ ij is given by:
where A ij consists of two dummies included to compare the activities of WMs whose mandate finished before groups started undertaking collective actions and WMs whose mandate finished after the first SHG did. More specifically, we set:
• SHG present = 1 if SHGs were present in ward j during the mandate of WM i, but did not undertake collective actions
• SHG active = 1 if an SHG undertook collective actions in ward j during the mandate of WM i B ij is a set of controls describing the WMs' characteristics. It includes education level, land ownership, the total number of children, age, caste category and a dummy indicating the WM is a man. 23 C ij is a set of dummies included to control for the year in which the WM was elected (elected in '97, '02 or '07 ). The omitted category is elected in '92. The 21 We asked this both as an open question and proposing the list of issues we are particularly interested in. 22 The Poisson fixed effects model is more commonly used than the negative binomial model, as it is consistent under much weaker assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . 23 Castes are classified in the following categories: ST (scheduled tribe), SC (scheduled caste), OBC (other backward caste) and FC (forward caste).
dummies are included to ensure that the influence of SHGs does not pick up election year effects, as for example the quality of WMs might increase over time. Finally, ν j is a ward fixed effect and ij is the error term.
The dummy SHG active might potentially be endogenous as, for instance, a WM particularly sensitive to women issues might encourage SHGs to become active. We show in Section 4.3 that this is unlikely to be the case.
The results are given in Table 4 . The columns (1) and (2) provide the estimates of the Poisson fixed effects model. The coefficients are transformed to incidence-rate ratios. 24 WMs operating in wards where SHGs undertake collective actions, deal with almost twice the number of issues than WMs who operate in wards where SHGs are not created. In absolute terms, this implies that WMs deal with about one extra topic. The result confirms our first prediction: the active presence of an SHG leads to an increase in the number of issues the WM deals with, as measured by a larger variety of goods. The result is similar when we use standard linear regression techniques (columns (3) and (4)). 25 We also find that male WMs deal with fewer issues. To explore whether SHGs influence male and female WMs differently, we include an interaction term in the columns (2) and (4). We find that the impact on male WMs is smaller. As the impact remains remarkably high, and as these results are not our main interest, we will no longer differentiate between male and female WMs in the remainder of the paper. 26 4.2 Prediction 2: Extra issues discussed by the WM Table 4 shows that WMs deal with a larger variety of ward problems as a response to actions of SHGs. We now want to examine whether the WM starts dealing with the public goods preferred by SHGs. To do that, we run the following OLS regressions:
24 Incidence-rate ratios are the exponentiated coefficients. For dummy variables, they provide the ratio of the conditional expectations of the dependent variable for the two values taken by the dummy:
= exp(β) (4) 25 We also explored a complementary explanation. Since WMs are democratically elected, we can expect the impact of SHGs to be stronger when the number of SHG members is larger. To check this explanation, we constructed variables measuring the electoral weight of SHGs. We indeed find that a larger number of SHG members corresponds to a wider set of problems WMs feel responsible for. The results are available upon request.
26 Furthermore, this result does not hold for all robustness checks (see Section 4.4). where T ijt is a dummy equal to one if WM i in ward j dealt with issue t. The independent variables are the same as for Prediction 1. The results are given in Table 5 . Once SHGs undertake collective actions, WMs are 28% more likely to deal with alcohol problems, 23% with school problems and 25% with forest issues. Thus, the estimates confirm that WMs start dealing with public goods preferred by SHGs (see Section 2.2). Prediction 2 states that these include goods that either exert a negative externality on other villagers or that the WM is not aware of. As described in the introduction, alcohol production and consumption is the best example of an issue on which men and women disagree. Although welfare schemes belong to the main responsibilities of WMs, we observe a sig-nificant impact. 27 Interestingly, male WMs are less likely to take care of alcohol issues, school problems and welfare schemes, but they are more likely to deal with village infrastructure. 28
Selection
By providing support and reducing the (psychological) cost of actions, WMs particularly sensitive to women's issues might induce SHGs to become active. In that case, the results would be spurious: if WMs anyhow become receptive to a wider range of issues, the regressions might be capturing political trends only. In order to exclude this possibility, we check whether WM characteristics predict SHGs becoming active. An insignificant impact validates the approach we followed in the previous subsections. 29 For WM i in ward j, the dummy active ij equals one if the first SHG became active during his mandate, and zero otherwise. We estimate the following linear probability model:
issues (i−1)j is the number of issues discussed by the previous WM in ward j. B ij is a set of controls for WM i, C ij is a set of dummies included to control for the year in which the WM was elected, ν j is a ward fixed effect and ij the error term. The results are given in Table 6 . In column (1), we do not include ward fixed effects, nor the election year dummies. In column (2) we add ward fixed effects. In this case, the coefficient of issues (i−1)j is positive and significant. But as we add the election year dummies, the correlation is no longer significant (column (3)). Moreover, we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients for the WM characteristics are zero (p-value = 0.30). These results suggest that, controlling for ward heterogeneity and time trend, the SHG decision to become active is uncorrelated with both the activities of the previous WM and his characteristics.
Robustness checks
In this subsection we perform a series of robustness checks. First, we examine whether our results still hold when we simply compare the activities of WMs before and after an SHG was created. Secondly, we include a ward-level linear trend, which allow us to control better for a ward specific evolution over time. Finally, we take into account that, apart from SHGs, 27 This result does not hold for all robustness checks (see Section 4.4). 28 The results do not change if we allow the errors to be correlated across equations for a given WM by using seemingly unrelated regressions estimation techniques. They are available with the authors upon request. 29 The discussion in this subsection is based on DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007). Other Groups were created in a subset of wards. Thus far, we did not focus on those groups, as their creation might be endogenous. But, to exclude that their potential influence biases our results, we re-run the regressions taking them into account.
Using the presence of SHGs only
Although we do not find evidence of selection, we examine whether our results hold when we do not include the dummy SHG active and simply compare the activities of WMs before and after an SHG was created. As discussed in Section 2.3, we believe that the creation of SHGs is an exogenous event. A ij in regression (3) reduces to
• SHG present = 1 if SHGs are present in ward j during the mandate of WM i
The results, shown in Table 7 , confirm both predictions. The presence of SHGs has a positive influence on the number of problems WMs deal with (columns (1) and (2)). The columns (3) to (7) show the results per issue. The probability that WMs deal with alcohol increases by about 11%, with school problems by about 12% and with forest issues by about 13%. There is no significant impact on village infrastructure and welfare schemes, which are the two main responsibilities of the WMs.
Interestingly, we do not find a different impact on male and female WMs (column (2)). Furthermore, after including the interaction, we no longer find that male WMs deal with fewer issues. 
A ward-level linear trend
We replace the election year dummies by ward-level linear trends. The results, displayed in Table 8 , are similar. The activities of SHGs have a positive influence on the number of issues WMs deal with. WMs are on average 35% more likely to deal with alcohol problems and 26% with forest issues. But the coefficient for school problems is no longer significant. We include the interactions to control for a possible substitution or complementarity effect between SHGs and Other Groups.
The results are shown in Table 9 . The impact of SHGs on the total number of different issues WMs deal with is strikingly similar to what we found in Table 4 . Other Groups also have a positive influence on the WMs activities, but the point estimate is smaller. The coefficient of the interaction between SHGs and Other Groups is significant and smaller than 1, suggesting that they are imperfect substitutes.
The results for the regressions per issue are given in the columns (3) to (7) in Table 9 . Compared to Table 5 , we find a slightly larger coefficient for forest issues. The impact of Other Groups is even larger. This is not surprising, since most of them are forest committees and rarely discuss more than one issue (Table 2) . 30 Interestingly, our results suggest that the predictions of the model might also hold for Other Groups. Applying the same reasoning we used for SHGs, we should conclude that the interest of Other Groups in forest issues induce WMs to start dealing with them. Unfortunately assessing the causality is somewhat more problematic in this case, as 24% of Other Groups are created thanks to direct interventions of the local governments and, thus, their presence cannot be reliably considered exogenous. Our results still hold though when we exclude those wards from the sample.
Public Good Provision
As mentioned in Section 2.3, a caveat of our empirical results is that we can focus on the type of public goods only and not on the quality and the intensity of the work done by the ward member. Knowing how often each problem appeared, how often the ward member tried to solve it and how successful he was, would allow us to measure the impact of SHGs more precisely. Unfortunately, it is hard to get this precise information. Nonetheless, we Standard errors clustered at the ward level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 asked SHGs how effective their collective actions were, i.e. whether they obtained what they requested or, at least, received the promise that a solution was to be provided. The answers to these questions are summarized in column (1) of Table 10 . SHGs received a positive response in 85 to 90% of the wards where they undertook collective actions. Most likely this overestimates the success of SHGs, as there might be a selection issue: SHGs undertake actions only if they believe they will be successful. We try to correct for selection in the columns (2) and (3). For each type of issue, we asked SHGs if they faced it at least once. In column (2) we show the percentage of success over all the wards where the problem appeared, independent of whether an SHG undertook action or not. Hence, we assume that SHGs which did not undertake action were not successful. Finally, in column (3), we assume that all the problems appeared in all the wards. Column (2) might underestimate the impact of SHGs, and yet the figures are still remarkably high. The data suggest that undertaking action for alcohol issues led to a solution in one third of the wards. Therefore, despite some obvious limitations, we believe to be providing reliable evidence about the positive impact of collective actions by socially disadvantaged women.
Conclusions
We examine the impact of SHGs' collective actions on the variety of problems dealt with by local governments. We provided a simple model suggesting two predictions that we test and confirm with an empirical study. First, we find that ward members take care of a larger variety of ward issues when SHGs undertake collective actions. Second, ward members start dealing with the public goods preferred by SHGs. These include goods that either exert a negative externality on other villagers or whose importance the ward members were not aware of. In particular, ward members are more likely to deal with alcohol, forest and school problems. With respect to issues that exert a negative externality on other villagers, the most controversial and therefore best example is probably alcohol.
We believe that different incentives may simultaneously play a role and lead SHGs to undertaking collective action, like reputation, visibility and altruism. Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether the phenomena we observe are related or not to the financial role of SHGs. Our results suggest that similar outcomes could be attained by different types of groups, not necessarily related to finance. But this should not lead to understatements on the role of microfinance in India. In the context of our survey region, where the social role of women is restrained, intra-household interactions may play an important role. In this respect, the explicit financial aim typical of SHGs can make the difference by providing a socially acceptable reason for women to meet regularly. 4. The previous points show that, under our conditions, c min < c and that the SHG prefers to be active when c = c. Since U c 2 (g * 1 , g * 2 , g * 2c , λ 2 ) is increasing when c ∈ [c min ,c], it follows that U c 2 (g * 1 , g * 2 , g * 2c , λ 2 ) ≥ U 2 (ĝ 1 ,ĝ 2 , λ 2 ) over the whole interval [c,c] . Now suppose that c >c. Then g * 2c = 0 and, as c increases, the difference g * 2 −ĝ 2 decreases while the differenceĝ 1 − g * 1 increases (since g * 1 decreases andĝ 1 is constant). By continuity, there exist a δ ∈ (c, c] such that U c 2 (g * 1 , g * 2 , g * 2c , λ 2 ) = U 2 (ĝ 1 ,ĝ 2 , λ 2 ). That proves that there is an interval of positive size to the right ofc in which the SHG still prefers to be active.
